ABSTRACT This paper investigates the detection and tracing problems in a multi-relay network, where a source wants to exchange the information with a destination through multiple potential malicious relay nodes. We find that the destination could probabilistically detect the maliciousness in a multi-relay network if and only if the network satisfies a non-manipulable condition. Notice that the non-manipulable condition of the whole network is complicated to be checked. We divide the whole network into several sub-networks, and check the non-manipulability of the small-scale sub-networks in turn, which finally constitutes to a simplified checking method of the non-manipulable condition for the whole relay network. Furthermore, we propose a tracing algorithm to pinpoint the malicious relays individually in a multi-relay network if a tracing condition is satisfied. No pre-shared secret is needed in our proposed detecting and tracing schemes. Numerical examples are presented to validate the effectiveness of the proposed schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The cooperative network promotes coverage and cooperation diversity under the assumption that each relay is trustworthy and cooperative completely [1] , [2] . However, relays are potential to be malicious by forwarding garbled symbols in practical scenarios. In this case, the malicious relays should be excluded from the cooperative network to prevent the corruption of communication and guarantee the performance of the cooperative technique. Thus, it is essential to detect and trace the malicious relay nodes if there exist [3] .
The problems of detecting and tracing malicious relays in cooperative networks have been widely concerned in recent years [3] - [10] . To be more specific, in [3] , a cross-layer detecting and tracing scheme employing space-time code was proposed by using pseudo-random tracing symbols. Nevertheless, the scheme proposed by [3] requires perfect channel state information (CSI). In [4] - [6] , several noncoherent schemes, where communication parties do not need perfect CSI, were proposed by inserting tracing symbols. Particularly, schemes proposed in [4] and [5] are only applicable for QPSK modulation. In [6] , the detecting scheme is extended to various signal constellations modulations. These tracingbased schemes [3] - [6] have one common attribute: they need to share some secret information beforehand to provide the content and location of tracing symbols. However, the secret information are still transmitted through the untrusted relays, which may utilize or modify these information to destruct the detection. In addition, the performance of these schemes [3] - [6] depends on a large number of tracing symbols, which yields bandwidth consumption severely. Furthermore, the maliciousness can also be detected without tracing symbols. A detecting scheme based on hybrid automatic repeat request (HARQ) protocol was proposed in [7] . Notice that with HARQ protocol, the source is allowed to estimate the number of frames that are delivered successfully. The scheme of [7] is carried out by the source, which compares the estimated successful transmission rate and the minimum frame success rate specified by quality of service (QoS). But this scheme requires the support of cooperative handshake, which indeed assumes the relay node to faithfully send back proper acknowledgements no matter whether it is malicious or not. Besides that, the scheme in [7] only focuses on detecting the malicious attacks that each malicious relay garbles its received symbols according to independent and identically distributed Bernoulli distribution. In [8] , all the possible misbehaviour of relay nodes are modeled by a noise injection or power reduction attack with identical parameter over time span. Under such an assumption, a detection scheme with orthogonal frequencydivision multiplexing (OFDM) was proposed by utilizing the correlation between the transmitted and received symbols of the source node. Notice that these schemes proposed in [7] and [8] only consider some certain types of independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) attacks. In addition, the schemes of [8] and [9] are implemented at the source node, which makes it difficult for the destination to discard the symbols forwarded by malicious relays. In our previous work [9] , [10] , we show that it is possible to detect any i.i.d. attack performed by malicious relays in a network with two independent relay nodes, only by observing the symbols received at the destination and without the help of any external aid or inserted redundancy. The performance of the detecting scheme [9] , [10] is guaranteed if the network satisfies a non-manipulable channel condition. However, the schemes of [9] and [10] only focuses on the detection in a two-relay network, and it cannot pinpoint the malicious relay.
In this paper, we extend our previous work to a relay network with arbitrary multiple independent relay nodes. In such a multi-relay network, communication is established between a source and a destination with the aid of multiple relays which are potential to be malicious. We prove that the destination can employ the received symbols it observes through multiple relay nodes, rather than any shared secret, to detect maliciousness if the network satisfies a non-manipulable condition. The contribution of this paper, which differentiates the paper from our previous work, are detailed as follows.
1) Comparing to a two-relay network, the non-manipulable condition in a multi-relay network is much more difficult to be checked. We first partition the multirelay network into several two-relay sub-networks, and check the non-manipulability of these small-scale sub-networks in turn. The obtained results are then employed to give a simplified method for checking whether the the whole multi-relay relay network is non-manipulable or not. On the other hand, it is worth noting that our previous work [9] , [10] only proposes the checking method for the two-relay network. 2) We also propose a trace algorithm in order to pinpoint the malicious relay node in a multi-relay network if a traceability condition is satisfied. As a beneficial result, the malicious relay nodes can be excluded to mitigate further corruption. In contrast, our previous work [9] , [10] does not consider to pinpoint the malicious relay individually.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the channel model and malicious definitions. The channel condition for detectability in a multi-relay network is investigated in Section III. In Section III-D, we state the trace scheme. In Section IV, we present numerical examples. Finally, we conclude this paper in Section V. For a discrete random variable X , we employ a set X to denote the alphabet of X with the size |X |. Let x be a generic element in X and [x] i be the ith element in X . That is,
For a sequence of symbols x n drawn from X , let [x] i be the ith symbol in x n . We employ X n to denote a sequence of random variables drawn from X , and also employ [X ] i to denote the ith variable in X n . Moreover, let us use 
n ) denotes the number of times that the symbol [x] i occurs in x n , while simultaneously symbol [y] j occurs in y n . Whenever it is needed, we may treat Π x n |y n as matrix whose the (i, j)th entry is
The similar definition can be applied to Π X n and Π X n |Y n .
B. CHANNEL MODEL
As is shown in Fig. 1 , the network considered is a twohop multi-relay network, which allows a source to transmit information to a destination through M (M 2) independent relay nodes. The relay nodes implement amplify-and-forward (AF) protocol. Each relay node is potential malicious by forwarding garbled symbols instead of its received symbols. The destination aims to detect and trace the malicious relays through the symbols obtained in physical-layer.
In our model, we use a discrete random variable X to denote the memoryless source. In the first 1, 2, · · · , n instants, the source transmits i.i.d. symbols to M relays through a memoryless broadcast channel (BC). For m = 1, 2, . . . , M , let the random variable U m be the generic received symbol by the mth relay node. Hence, the channel from the source to the mth relay is specified by the conditional probability mass function (pmf) P U m |X . Each relay processes the received symbols and then forwards the processed symbols, potentially garbled, to the destination in the second n + 1, n + 2, · · · , 2n instants. Correspondingly, let random variable V m be the generic forwarded symbol by the mth relay. Since the attacks conducted by the relays are assumed to be i.i.d., the action of the mth relay in each instant identically follow conditional pmf P V m |U m , and we also get 
to respectively represent the received random variables and generic symbols of M relays. The alphabet of
are conditional independent with each other given X , hence the BC is considered as physical degraded which satisfies
with the element defined as:
be the forwarded random variables and generic symbols of M relays corresponding to U and u. Without loss of generalization, U m and V m share the same alphabet which is denoted by U m . Hence U and V also have the same alphabet U . It is worth noting that the proposed scheme and analysis given below could be extended readily for the case that U m and V m do not share the same alphabet. For ease description, we assume they share the same alphabet in this paper. Furthermore, we impose a restriction on M relays which is defined as:
It indicates these relays are non-colluding in the sense that the action of each relay only depends on its own received symbols. Similarly, we use vector
represent the symbols respectively received by the destination from M relays. The variable Y m is also assumed to be conditional independent with any other variables given V m , hence the conditional pmf P Y |V is given by
We employ a |Y| × |U | matrix P Y |V to represent the conditional pmf of Y given V with the element defined as:
In the second n + 1, n + 2, · · · , 2n instants, the destination observe Y n from M relays. We use a 1 × |Y| vector Π Y n to represent type of Y n which is specified as:
In the next section, we will show that the destination can detect and trace the malicious relays by utilizing the observation of Y n .
C. MALICIOUSNESS DEFINITION
For m = 1, 2, . . . , M , the mth relay node can act in any i.i.d. manner described by the conditional pmf P V m |U m , which is unknown for the destination. According to the law of large numbers (LLN), the conditional type Π V n m |U n m converges to P V m |U m as n approaches infinity. Hence we can employ Π V n m |U n m to characterize the behavior of the m-th relay instead.
The conditional type Π The definition 1 tolerates manipulating only a negligible fraction of symbols through the relay. Hence, the toleration has no essential impact on the information rate. Upon the VOLUME 4, 2016 definition on malicious relay, we can define the maliciousness of the whole multi-relay network:
Definition 2 (Safe Network): In a multi-relay network, if all relay nodes are non-malicious, the relay network is considered safe. Otherwise, the relay network is unsafe.
According to the definition 2, it is easy to get
− I 2 → 0 when the network is safe. Hence, the detection of whether there exist malicious relays or not in a multi-relay network is equivalent to determining whether the network is safe or not.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the the problems of detecting and tracing maliciousness for a multi-relay network. We assume that P U and P Y |V are known at the destination. We will refer to the pair (P U , P Y |V ) as whole observation channel for the multi-relay network, which facilitates maliciousness detection.
A. MALICIOUSNESS DETECTABILITY
We first need to introduce the following definition based on the whole observation channel:
Otherwise, the observation channel is non-manipulable. Remark 1: According to LLN, we obtain
in probability as n approaches to infinity. On the other hand, if all relays are non-malicious, according to Definition 1, Π V m |U m → I , then we must have
. Thus, it is intuitive that if the observation channel is non-manipulable, comparing Π Y n and P U P T Y |V will tell us whether malicious attacks have been carried by the relays. This intuition is analytically confirmed by the following theorem.
Let D n = D n (Y n ) denote a decision statistic that is employed for maliciousness detection in the destination. The following theorem states that maliciousness detectability is equivalent to the non-manipulable condition of the whole observation channel.
Theorem 1 (Maliciousness Detection): The condition that the whole observation channel (P U , P Y |V ) is non-manipulable is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a sequence of decision statistics {D n } simultaneously having the following two properties: Fix any sufficiently small δ > 0 and > 0. For all sufficiently large n,
The Properties 1) and 2) of the theorem show that there exists an decision statistic to distinguish whether the multirelay network is safe or not if and only if the observation channel is non-manipulable. The miss detection probability and false alarm probability of the decision statistic can be arbitrarily small as n approaches to infinity. The proof of the Theorem 1 can be obtained readily according to our previous work [9] , [10] . Note that the non-manipulable condition of the whole observation channel is equivalent to the maliciousness detectability in a multi-relay network. It is difficult to check the non-manipulability of the observation channel directly. Hence, we proceed to find an simplified way for the checking problem in the following subsections.
B. MINIMUM OBSERVATION CHANNEL
Although it is difficult to check the non-manipulability of the network composing of arbitrary number of relays, the checking problem of a two-relay network has been studied in [9] and [10] . It motivates us to utilize the existing result of [9] and [10] to constitute a efficient and simplified method to check whether the considered network mentioned in Fig. 1 is non-manipulable or not.
In the multi-relay network mentioned in Fig. 1 , any two of M relay nodes can pairwise construct a two-relay subnetwork. To be more specific, for arbitrary s and t, as long as s, t = 1, 2, . . . , M and s = t, the sth and mth relays constitute a two-relay sub-network. Corresponding to P U and P Y |V , P U s ,U t represents the joint pdf of (U s , U t ) received by the sth and mth relays. P Y s ,Y t |V s ,V t specifies the channel from the two relays to the destination. Then, we refer to (P U s ,U t , P Y s ,Y t |V s ,V t ) as a minimum observation channel corresponding to the whole observation channel (P U , P Y |V ). It is obvious that there exist M 2 different minimum observation channels in the mentioned multi-relay network. Similar to the Definition 3, the non-maipulable of minimum observation channel is defined as follows [9] . 
Otherwise, the observation channel is non-manipulable.
Our previous work [9] proves if and only if (P U s ,U t , P Y s ,Y t |V s ,V t ) is non-manipulable, the destination can detect attacks only depends on its observation from the sth and tth relays (i.e., (Y n s , Y n t )) proposes method to check whether a minimum observation channel is non-manipulable or not. As shown in the next subsection, it provides a basis for the checking non-manipulability of the network composing of arbitrary number of relays.
C. CHECKING NON-MANIPULABILITY OF MULTI-RELAY NETWORK
For easy description of the proposition, which will be proposed later, we first give the definition as follows.
Definition 
On the basis of checking non-manipulability of minimum observation channel [9] , [10] , we can check nonmanipulability of the whole observation channel by the following proposition:
be divided into several minimum observation channels, and each minimum observation channel is non-manipulable, then P U , P Y |V must be non-manipulable.
The proof of Proposition 1 is shown in Appendix. From Proposition 1, the non-manipulability of P U , P Y |V could be determined by the non-manipulability of several minimum observation channels, whose checking method has been studied extensively in our previous work [9] , [10] . In order to illustrate the usage of Proposition 1, we consider the following case that a pair of relays (i.e., relay 1 and relay 2) with two communication parties constitute a nonmanipulable network. Meanwhile, the two communication parties with another pair of relays (i.e., relay 3 and relay 4) also constitute a non-manipulable network. Then, in such case, applying Proposition 1, we get that the network which consists of the two communication parties and multiple relays (i.e., relay 1-4) is non-manipulable. The non-manipulability of the whole network is obtained by non-manipulability of minimum observation channels, rather than checking Definition 3 directly. The computation of checking Definition 3 is thus avoided. In summary, Proposition 1 facilitates the practical scenario that some networks are recruited into a larger network. With Proposition 1, the non-manipulability of the larger network can be guaranteed by requiring each network that is recruited to be non-manipulable.
On the other hand, notice that Proposition 1 provides a sufficient but not necessary condition for the non-manipulability of observation channel. If the condition is not satisfied, the non-manipulability of observation channel cannot be checked by using Proposition 1. We have to resort to exhaustive search method for checking the non-manipulability.
D. TRACE SCHEME
As above-mentioned, the non-manipulability of P U , P Y |V guarantees the performance of maliciousness detection for the whole network. To be more precise, the detection just determines whether the network includes the malicious relay(s) or not. It is not able to determine which relay is malicious. The following proposition proposes a tracing condition with which the malicious relay could be traced individually.
Proposition 2 (The Tracing Condition): If all minimum observation channels are non-manipulable, then the destination could probabilistically 1) determine whether the total number of malicious relays is larger than M −2 or not; 2) and trace which relay is malicious if total number of malicious relay nodes is determined no more than M − 2.
In other words, in a multi-relay network with M relay nodes, the destination can trace any malicious relay provided there exist M − 2 malicious relays at most. If there are more than M − 2 malicious relays, the destination will be puzzled by the number of malicious relays. This proposition indicates that tracing the individual malicious relay node requires stricter channel conditions comparing to the maliciousness detectability condition in a multi-relay network. It accords with the fact that the detection result for each individual relay node implies the safeness of the whole relay network, however, the later one cannot indicate the former one exactly.
Furthermore, in order to prove Proposition 2, we detail a tracing algorithm for a network that satisfies the tracing condition. Firstly, let us enumerate all M 2 two-relay sub-networks. Since the tracing condition is satisfied, the observation channels of these two-relay sub-networks are non-manipulable. Hence, we can find decision statistic to determine the maliciousness of all two-relay sub-networks, respectively. Then, based on the detection result, we construct an M × M adjacency matrix T whose diagonal entries are all zero, and for s = t, the (s, t)th element is defined as:
1 the sub-network constructed by the sth and tth relays is determined as non-malicious; 0 otherwise.
Obviously, T is a symmetric matrix whose diagonal is zeros. Upon T , we develop an trace algorithm as shown in Algorithm 1.
The underlying logic of Algorithm 1 is that if a relay node is malicious, any two-relay sub-network including this malicious relay must be determined as malicious. Hence, T is non-zero matrix if and only if the number of malicious relays is no larger than M − 2. From the observation, we could firstly determine the number of malicious relays according to whether T equals to 0 or not. Then, after we have confirmed there are at least 2 non-malicious relays in the network, The the number of malicious relays is determined to exceed M − 2. 3: else 4: The the number of malicious relays is determined to no larger than M − 2.
5:
for s = 1 : 1 : M do 6 :
The s-th relay is determined as malicious. 8 :
The s-th relay is determined as non-malicious. 
IV. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
In the numerical examples, we consider a relay network that consists of three relays. The source has a binary alphabet (i.e.,|X | = 2) with distribution P X = [0.5, 0.5]. The broadcast channels from the source to the relays are binary erasure channels, all relay alphabets are ternary (i.e.,|U 1 | = |U 2 | = |U 3 | = 3). The channels from the source to the three relays are specified by the pmf matrices 2 minimum observation channels: (P U 1 ,U 2 , I ), (P U 2 ,U 3 , I ), and (P U 1 ,U 3 , I ). It is no hard to get P U 1 ,U 2 ,U 3 |X from P U 1 |X ⊗ P U 2 |X ⊗ P U 3 |X . Hence, P U = vec(P U 1 ,U 2 ,U 3 |X ). All minimum observation channels (P U 1 ,U 2 , I ), (P U 2 ,U 3 , I ), (P U 1 ,U 3 , I ) can be checked to be nonmanipulable easily [9] .
According to Proposition 1, the whole observation channel P U , P Y |V is non-manipulable. We employ a decision statistic D n = Π Y n − P U P T Y |V 2 to distinguish whether the three-relay network is safe or not. We simulate two different attacks termed as Attack 1 and Attack 2, respectively. In Attack 1, all relays garble their received symbols according to the distributions specified by the When n = 2 × 10 5 , we succeed in distinguishing by selecting the decision threshold for D n at 10 −2 . It indicates D n satisfies properties 1) and 2) of Theorem 1. Hence the maliciousness of this three-relay network can be detected. Moreover, notice that the decision statistic works well as the value of n is very high. It accords with the fact that Theorem 1 is established upon n approaches to infinity. This property may cause latency issue in practical. The design of decision statistic at cost of limited number of observations is of very useful, which may be a direction in further research. Notice that all minimum observation channels of the considered network are non-manipulable. Hence, the tracing condition is satisfied. According to Proposition 2, the proposed trace algorithm is applicable. In order to verify it, we consider three different malicious cases. In the first case, the 2nd relay is assumed to be malicious while the other two relays are non-malicious. In the second case, only the 1st relay is nonmalicious. In the third case, all three relays are malicious. For convenience, we will use × and √ to denote the corresponding relay is malicious or not. Then, these three malicious cases are denoted as (
respectively. Furthermore, the action of each malicious relay is specified by the matrix = For tracing maliciousness in each case, we first need to determine whether each two-relay sub-network is malicious or not. In particular, for s, t = 1, 2, 3, s = t, we employ the
detect attacks in the sub-network constituted by the sth and t-th relays. Next, the cdfs of these three decision statistics 2, 3) and D n (1, 3) obtained in simulation are plotted in Fig. 4, 5 and 6 for the three cases, respectively. As shown in the figures, it is obvious to separate the empirical cdfs for the non-malicious case from malicious case. It indicates we could succeed in determining whether the sub-network constituted by the sth and tth relays is malicious or not by using D n (s,t) . With this detection result, we could get T according to (3) However, in the other two cases, we only get an adjacency matrix T = 0. The result accords with Proposition 2 that malicious relay node can be traced under the condition that total number of malicious relay nodes in a M -relay network is no more than M − 2.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we introduce the minimum observation channel to simplify the detectability condition of a multi-relay network. In particular, we prove that the non-manipulability of each minimum observation channel is a sufficient condition for the non-manipulability of the whole observation channel. Furthermore, we establish a traceability condition on a multirelay network for our trace algorithm to pinpoint the specific malicious relay in the network. Simulation results demonstrate that our scheme can trace the malicious relay nodes in a multi-relay network.
APPENDIX PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
The proof can be given from the opposition. We will first assume that the whole observation channel P U , P Y |V is manipulable, but there exist an division where all minimum observation channels (P U s ,U t , P Y s ,Y t |V s ,V t ) are nonmanipulable. Hence, there exists at least one malicious relay behavior with Π
For notation convenience, we divide all M relay nodes into two parts, one part is a set e, the other is a set e c . Between them, e denotes an two-relay sub-network including the m -th relay and e c denotes a (M − 2)-relay sub-network without two relays in e, respectively. We also employ vec- 
Note that in the sub-network e c , it is obvious to get 
The last equality is due to the first equation of (5) 
where (a) holds because the mixed product property of Kronecker product is applied here, and (b) holds because of the second equation of (5). Therefore, upon (6) and (7) = I , the corresponding minimum observation channel of the sub-network e must be manipulable, which yields a contradiction. Thus, we have proved if P U , P Y |V can be divided into several minimum observation channels which are all non-manipulable, then P U , P Y |V must be non-manipulable. 
